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INTRODUCTION
The effort of modern political theory to understand multicultural-
ism has engendered a variety of responses, depending upon the theo-
retical tradition (e.g., liberalism, communitarianism) and the nature
of the group (e.g., immigrant groups, descendants of slaves, indige-
nous peoples). Contemporary political philosophers struggle with
two primary issues: the rights and status of "ethnocultural minorities
in multi-ethnic societies," and the virtues and responsibilities of
democratic citizenship.' There are, of course, many tensions between
these two areas of civic life in multicultural societies, and philoso-
phers differ as to whether these are ultimately irreconcilable aspects
of multiculturalism.
Indigenous peoples pose one of the most problematic cases within
multiculturalism. Universally recognized as being the "first" inhabi-
tants of subsequently colonized lands, indigenous peoples across the
globe have an ambiguous status-alternatively considered by their
encompassing nation-states to be "quasi-sovereign nations," "tribes,"
or "ethnic minorities." This ambiguous status is largely the result of
historical circumstance. With each successive transfer of lands be-
tween colonizing governments and indigenous peoples, the Native
people lost rights, gained other rights, and reached a new political
accommodation with the "national sovereign." The tensions wrought
by multiculturalism in the contemporary world often manifest them-
selves in tribal wars and nationalistic fervor, leading to uncertainty
about how the legal and moral claims of indigenous peoples should
be adjudicated within modern pluralistic democracies such as the
United States and Canada.
Lincoln Professor of Native American Law and Ethics and Executive Director, Indian Le-
gal Program, Arizona State University College of Law.
I See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts,
Concepts, in CmZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES I (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000).
JOURNAL OF CONS7TITIONAL oA W
Today, American Indian nations within the United States are con-
sidered "domestic" sovereigns. Indian nations enjoy both political
and cultural sovereignty as an aspect of their inherent status as sepa-
rate governments. This sovereignty is "preconstitutional" and also
extraconstitutional" in character. The sovereignty of Indian nations
existed prior to the formation of the United States, and the Indian
nations are not signatories to the United States Constitution. Thus,
although the Constitution explicitly regulates the relationship of In-
dian nations with the federal and state governments, the Indian na-
tions are not "parties" to the Constitution and thus, their powers are
not limited by provisions such as the Bill of Rights. In short, the na-
ture of Indian tribes as separate "nations" within a pluralistic, consti-
tutional democracy leads to many complexities that have yet to be re-
solved.
Currently, Indian law jurisprudence is experiencing a concerted
attack on "tribalism" as violative of fundamental constitutional norms.
Much of that attack is due to the fact that tribal governments increas-
ingly exert jurisdiction as sovereigns within their territorial borders,
over both Indians and non-Indians. Non-Indians, of course, are gen-
erally the "minority" on reservation lands. The political governance
of a minority by a majority, of course, is not a new problem for Indian
nations. Since the early days of this nation's history, Indian nations
have been a political minority governed by a non-Indian majority.
This continuing reality has inspired tireless efforts to articulate the
nature of tribal "rights" as governments, as minorities, and as "peo-
ples." Yet, the question of tribal governance of non-Indians has be-
come a political football, triggering both legislative3 and judicial4 at-
tempts to limit tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. The underlying
assumption appears to be that non-Indians' rights cannot be re-
spected under tribal judicial and legislative systems. However, rather
than asserting rights claims within the tribal system, the non-Indian
strategy has been to use external power to curtail tribal governmental
authority. The emerging view of tribal sovereignty is insular: a sepa-
rate domain for members, where tribal governance is tolerated but
not accepted under dominant norms of constitutionalism.
2 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (1987).
3 For example, former Washington State Senator Slade Gorton was notorious for his efforts
to curtail tribal sovereign immunity. See Timothy Egan, Senate Measures Would Deal Blow to Indian
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at Al. Senator Gorton claimed that tribal sovereign immunity
"denies non-Indians due process." Jeff Barker, Plan Would End Tribal Immunity, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Aug. 28, 1997, at Al. He also asserted that it might be time to force a change in the status of
Indian tribes as "nations within a nation." Egan, supra at A20.
4 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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One of the primary catalysts for this debate resides in the notion
of "citizenship." Today, indigenous peoples in Canada and the
United States possess citizenship in the larger nations that colonized
their lands, with all of the rights which that citizenship entails, yet
they also possess citizenship within their aboriginal groups. This
"dual citizenship" justifies certain "special" rights, which distinguish
indigenous people from citizens belonging to other cultural groups.
This engenders resentment among non-Indian citizens, who associate
such rights with "affirmative action" and argue that all citizens should
have the same rights as "equals" under the Constitution. The resis-
tance to a "differentiated citizenship" for Native people carries over
to the question of tribal authority over nonmembers. Non-Indians
frequently resist tribal jurisdiction on the basis that it is "unconstitu-
tional" to subject United States citizens to the authority of a govern-
ment that is not regulated by the Constitution, and which may em-
ploy different values and norms of governance.'
This essay examines the tension between tribalism and constitu-
tionalism in contemporary Indian law jurisprudence, highlighting the
critical departures from historical precedent in contemporary legal
doctrine and also the international debates over tribalism, national-
ism and cultural pluralism, which provide a rich context for interpre-
tation of domestic law. I use the term "tribalism" to refer to the ef-
forts of indigenous groups to define their political and cultural
identity as separate from that of the larger nation-state. I discuss the
United States and Canada as examples of nation-states that possess a
constitutional democracy which defines the terms under which citi-
zens relate to one another within an overall "civil society." I use the
term "constitutionalism" to refer to that process.
The primary purpose of this essay is to examine whether indige-
nous peoples' claims are inconsistent with the ideals of a "civil soci-
ety" and evaluate the possibility of an appropriate accommodation
between tribalism and constitutionalism. Part I of the essay offers a
historical perspective on the tension between tribalism and constitu-
tionalism in American jurisprudence. Part II of the article examines
the normative foundations of constitutionalism, America's commit-
ment to pluralism, and discusses how tribalism is reconciled within
the discourse of citizenship. Part III of the article explores the dy-
namic interaction between tribalism, notions of self-determination,
and the construction of indigenous peoples' political identity. Part
IV provides a doctrinal analysis of the conflict between tribalism and
constitutionalism in domestic law, focusing on the discomfort of the
federal courts in recognizing "special rights" for Indian nations, and
5 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1928) (discussing arguments
concerning the lack of procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution in Tribal Courts).
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the perceived conflict between individual rights and group rights.
Part V of the article provides a theoretical analysis of the potential ac-
commodation between tribalism and constitutionalism, examining
various modes of political accommodation of pluralism in contempo-
rary democratic societies.
I. TRIBALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICAN LAW:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The tension between tribalism and constitutionalism has been
part of American law since the early days of this nation's history. In-
fluenced by international policy and perspectives, these debates have
been extended to Indian law jurisprudence as a means of defining
the constitutional position of tribal governments. At a fundamental
level, Native American "tribalism"-best represented by the concept
of "tribal sovereignty"-appears to conflict with national sovereignty.
What is the reason for this perceived conflict? It cannot be merely
the notion of another layer of sovereignty within the federal system.
After all, American federalism is premised on the notion of "dual, or
divided sovereignty. 6 The divisions between federal, state and local
government are fundamental to American federalism. Moreover,
American federalism speaks of the distinction between "legal sover-
eignty," which is vested in the agents of government, and "political
sovereignty," which resides with the people The concept of tribal
sovereignty merely adds another dimension to this rich mixture of le-
gal, political, and popular sovereignty. In reality, the perceived con-
flict between tribalism and constitutionalism appears to be a response
to the character of tribal sovereignty in its relationship to the norma-
tive structure of the American constitutional democracy.
A. Tribalism v. Constitutionalism: The Foundations of the Dispute
The foundations for the contemporary dispute over tribalism and
constitutionalism emerged in the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia.8 In that case, three distinct views of tribal sovereignty emerged
from the six Supreme Court Justices who considered the legal issue of
whether the Court should assume original jurisdiction over a lawsuit
by the Cherokee Nation against the state of Georgia on the theory
that the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign nation" for purposes of Arti-
6 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 54 (discussing generally the concept of dual sovereignty).
Id.
8 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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cle III 'of the Constitution.9 At this time, of course, the citizens of the
Cherokee Nation were not citizens of the United States, and their at-
torney argued that as an "aggregate of aliens," they constituted a
"foreign nation."10
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the majority opinion, holding
that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation for purposes of
Article Ill.11 Justice Marshall's opinion, joined by Justice McLean,
found that the Cherokee Nation was instead a "domestic dependent
nation. "" Marshall's "domestic sovereignty" argument established the
Cherokee Nation's status as a separate "state"-a "distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself."13 Yet, Marshall claimed that the Cherokee Na-
tion was so completely under the "sovereignty and dominion of the
United States" as to negate the Cherokee's claim to "foreign" status.
Chief Justice Marshall's "domestic sovereignty" argument has pre-
vailed in federal Indian law, and seems most consistent with what Pro-
fessor Wilkinson calls the "measured separatism" of Indian tribes in
America: a relationship that allows for partial tribal autonomy under
federal supervision.
14
Justices Johnson and Baldwin wrote separate concurring opinions
asking whether the Indian tribes retained a separate political status
that would entitle them to exercise rights in conflict with the interests
of the states. Justice Johnson questioned whether a classification of
"nations" or "states" could be applied to a "people so low in the grade
of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are. 15 Draw-
ing on themes of conquest and the stereotypical Indian "hunter-
gatherer" society, Johnson claimed that the federal government had
tolerated the Indians' continued occupation of certain lands for
hunting purposes until such a time as they could become incorpo-
rated into the rest of society. Yet, he claimed that the preemptive
right and "exclusive right of conquest" continued to exist in the states
which circumscribed Indian territory. He acknowledged that the In-
dians retained certain rudimentary rights of self-government. Even
so, he claimed, under the Law of Nations, Indians were entitled to
nothing more than status as "wandering hordes, held together only
by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or government,
Article III provides that the federal judicial power "shall extend to... Controversies...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
n Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 17.
14 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 14.
15 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 (Johnson,J., concurring).
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beyond what is required in a savage state." 16 Justice Johnson's "anti-
sovereignty" argument was premised on a perception of Indian tribes
as uncivilized savages who were incapable of true governmental
status, as well as a states' rights position that considered the broad
exercise of state authority to be the inevitable goal of American fed-
eralism.
Justice Thompson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Story, which concluded that the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign
state, within the sense and meaning of the constitution."17 Justice
Thompson theorized that the terms "nation" and "state" were inter-
changeable within the Law of Nations, and both terms designated a
"body of men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and
advantage, by means of their union."'" Such a society becomes a
"moral person," Thompson claimed, "having an understanding and a
will peculiar to itself," and "susceptible of obligations and laws."19
Thompson found that such a society could be deemed "sovereign" so
long as it was able to "govern itself by its own authority and laws." Jus-
tice Thompson's "international sovereignty" argument equated In-
dian nations with European sovereigns who had placed themselves
under the protection of a more powerful nation for purposes of po-
litical expediency. Thus, although the Cherokee Nation had by treaty
placed itself under the protection of the United States, Thompson
found that the Cherokee Nation still constituted a sovereign state,
capable of self-government under its own laws and political institu-
tions.
Throughout subsequent eras of federal policy, these three sets of
views have continued to characterize the debate over the constitu-
tional status of Indian tribes. Although American jurists have gener-
ally not taken seriously the argument that Indian tribes are "foreign
nations," the issue of a separate national identity continues to surface
in Native peoples' claims for self-determination under international
human rights law. This position, for example, underlies the current
claim of Native Hawaiians for reinstatement of their historical mon-
archy, which was illegally overthrown by a group of American nation-
als with assistance from the United States military. For the most part,
however, federal Indian law has incorporated the "domestic sover-
eignty" view of Justices Marshall and McLean. The emphasis within
federal Indian law jurisprudence has focused on testing the bounda-
ries of the dominant society's political hegemony over Native people,
as opposed to Native peoples' assertions of separate governmental
16 Id. at 26.
17 Id. at 52 (Thompson,J., dissenting).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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status. However, the "anti-sovereignty" position expressed by Justices
Thompson and Baldwin has been a consistent undercurrent in In-
dian Law opinions which treat tribal governments as temporary and
seek to establish the point at which tribal sovereignty ends and state
sovereignty prevails.
For example, in Worcester v. Georgia, the follow-up opinion to
Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall held that the boundaries of
Cherokee territory defined an area of exclusive tribal and federal
authority in which state law had no effect.' ° Marshall's opinion,
which was premised on his domestic sovereignty argument, deline-
ated a version of federalism in which tribal and state power operated
in separate spheres under the overriding authority of the federal gov-
ernment. However, Justice McLean's separate opinion speculated
that state law might apply on reservations where tribal society had, in
effect, been "detribalized" through the members' assimilation to non-
Indian ways.2' McLean's argument for "de facto termination" based
on assimilation formed the basis for his later decision in United States
v. Cisna, which held that the assimilation of the Wyandotts into the
surrounding white population justified suspension of federal law on
the Wyandott Reservation sufficient to permit the intrusion of state
jurisdiction over a criminal act by a non-Indian against an Indian.2
Justice McLean's view that the perceived "detribalization" of an In-
dian nation can serve as justification for ceding jurisdiction to the
state has contemporary manifestations. In particular, McLean's "de
facto termination" argument has been incorporated into contempo-
rary cases dealing with "diminishment of reservations and tribal juris-
diction over non-Indians.
2
1
B. The Normative Critique
The tensions between tribalism and constitutionalism throughout
history, as well as in the modern era, involve whether the exercise of
tribal sovereignty tends to defeat the uniform exercise of state law
and authority and whether it impairs the normative foundations of
Anglo-American democratic society. For example, in the Removal
Era of the mid-1800s, federal policy appeared to adhere to Justice
Johnson's view that tribalism was incompatible with a version of
American Constitutionalism dedicated to the flourishing of state gov-
ernments and the expansion of non-Indian civilization. Y4 During the
20 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
21 See id. at 592; see also WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 33.
22 See 25 F. Gas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795); see also WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 34.
For further discussion of this phenomenon, see infra Part IV(A).
24 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Ra-
cism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989)
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Termination Era of the 1950s, policymakers associated tribalism with
a failure of individual tribal members to reach their full human po-
tential as "citizens." By "freeing" Indian tribes and their members
from " [f]ederal supervision and control and from all disabilities and
limitations specially applicable to Indians," Congress intended to in-
tegrate Indian people into a unitary civil society, with all the "respon-
25sibilities and privileges" of other citizens.
The contemporary era of Self-Determination poses a bit of a
paradox for American policymakers. On the one hand, the Self-
Determination policy affirms the status of Indian nations as separate
governments and approves of their expanding regulatory role on the
reservation. On the other hand, this expanding regulatory role cre-
ates new challenges for the incorporation of tribal sovereignty into
American federalism as tribes increasingly exercise jurisdiction over
nonmembers and generate policies that impact non-Indian interests.
Congress and the courts have responded unevenly to these con-
temporary challenges, inspiring different critiques by Indian law
scholars. Professor Wilkinson and some other scholars consider
tribal governments to be "part of the constitutional structure" of
American government.26 Professor Wilkinson argues that tribes were
acknowledged by the Constitution and that the treaties between the
tribes and the federal government serve as a contract between sover-
eigns that allocates their respective powers, much as the Tenth
Amendment serves as an agreement between the states and the fed-
eral government. Under this argument, tribes have been incorpo-
rated within the federal system and should be acknowledged as pos-
sessing a broad scope of authority within the reservation, even as to
27activities involving non-Indians. On the other hand, under this ar-
gument, tribal governments should be willing to submit to a limited
degree of review by the federal courts to ensure that persons under
tribal jurisdiction are not subjected to unfair treatment. 2' Thus, un-
der this model, domestic law can and should be used to effectively
regulate the spheres of sovereignty between the Indian nations, the
states, and the federal governments.
Other scholars, such as Professors Robert A. Williams and S. James
Anaya query the basic justice of domestic law for Native Americans
(inclusive of American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians)
(providing a historical account of the Removal Era view that tribalism was incompatible with the
expansion of non-Indian civilization).
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
26 See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 103; Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian
Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican
Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994).
27 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 117.
28 Id. at 115-16.
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and suggest the application of international human rights norms that
govern "peoples" as a way to counter the negative impacts of domestic
policy on tribal self-government. Under this view, tribal govern-
ments may choose some degree of association with the national gov-
ernment, yet they preserve their distinct political identity as "peoples"
and maintain a significant degree of independence and autonomy
that sets them apart from the states or other ethnic groups that have
been incorporated within the United States. The rights of "indige-
nous peoples" under international law are essentially basic human
rights that are tailored to promoting their cultural survival and their
ancestral connections to important lands and resources that facilitate
that cultural survival.-" Under this view, an overarching international
normative system should regulate the domestic relationship of Indian
nations to the federal government and even the state government.
Between these two views are scholars such as Robert Porter, who
argue that to be genuinely "sovereign," Indian nations must resist any
"domestic" constitutional relationship with the United States gov-
ernment, even as American citizens, and hold out for the same status
as international nation-states.3' Under this view, presumably, Indian
nations are completely autonomous and have the ability to choose
their associations among the nation-states of the world without regard
to their territorial position within the national boundaries of the
United States. 2
These scholarly views structure the interpretation of existing legal
rights in the United States for American Indian and Alaska Native
Nations. However, they also provide a framework for the develop-
ment and articulation of rights for the Native Hawaiian people. Cur-
rently, the Native Hawaiian people are exploring whether they should
accept a domestic status under federal law as a "recognized" Native
group with partial rights to self-government, whether they should
continue to press for reinstatement of their independent constitu-
tional monarchy under international law, or whether they should try
to articulate a new set of rights and relationships as "indigenous peo-
This is the upshot, for example, of an article by Professors Williams and Anaya on The Pro-
tection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human
Rights System, which compares the treatment of indigenous peoples' land rights under domestic
law in several countries with various normative principles of international human rights law. 14
HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 33 (2001).
30 See id. See also generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).
Sl See, e.g., Robert Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Re-
dressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV.
BLACKLETrERL.J. 107 (1999).
32 See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998) (arguing for the decolonization of federal Indian
Control law).
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pies" under the self-determination rubric of international human
rights law. Senator Akaka has introduced legislation into Congress
that would accord Native Hawaiians the right to form a government
that would be recognized by the federal government on terms that
are similar, but not identical, to the status accorded American Indian
and Alaska Native peoples." Participants in the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement, however, dismiss this bill as merely another effort to cure
the United States' illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, and
assert that political recognition of the Nation of Hawaii is the only le-
gitimate mode of self-governance for Native Hawaiian peoples.
3 4
Other scholars, such as James Anaya, have suggested that application
of human rights norms could provide an intermediate solution that
would protect Native Hawaiian rights of self-determination and cul-
tural integrity, while preserving a domestic relationship with the
United States.5
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND THE IDEALS OF CITIZENSHIP
The tension between tribalism and constitutionalism is a product
of historical circumstance as well as theoretical debates over the
"best" ways for communities to organize and govern themselves. The
normative foundations of constitutionalism are often perceived to be
in tension with those of tribalism, and the central focus of the debate
appears to be over which system is best suited to achieve our "com-
mon" goals. This Part of the article examines the normative founda-
tions of constitutionalism, America's commitment to pluralism, and
discusses how tribalism is reconciled within the discourse of citizen-
ship.
A. The Normative Foundations of Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is a "way of political life in which a people con-
stitute themselves as a community, conducting their affairs in accor-
dance with fundamental principles and through prescribed forms,
procedures and primary rules of obligation, in order to achieve the
ends and purposes that define their corporate existence."6 The idea
A Bill To Express the Policy of the United States Regarding the United States Relationship
with Native Hawaiians and To Provide a Process for the Recognition by the United States of the
Native Hawaiian Governing Entity, and for Other Purposes, S. 746, 107th Cong. (2001).
See Dennis Pu'uhonua "Bumpy" Kanahele, Clandestine Manipulation Toward Genocide, 34
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 63 (2002).
35 See S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: Toward
a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 312 (1994).
Herman Belz, Affirmative Action and American Equality: A Constitutionalist Perspective, in
LIBERTY UNDER LAW 209, 211 (Kenneth L. Grasso & Cecilia Rodriguez Castillo eds., 2d ed.
1998).
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that a "political community" can be coextensive with a "people" is a
central feature of American constitutionalism and responds to the
idea that America is a nation of immigrants built upon common ide-
als. The ideals of American constitutionalism are lofty, intended to
secure the goods of "virtue, reason, justice, liberty, property, equality,
and order" through a democratic process of government.37 Under
American constitutionalism, individual citizens-rather than groups
or classes-hold constitutional and legal rights. However, the ideal of
the citizen is founded upon a sense of belonging to a single "political
community," perhaps best represented by theories of civic republi-
canism.3
In fact, the idea of a single "political community" embodied
within constitutionalism is an important component of America's na-
tional identity. There is a mythological "creation story" that sur-
rounds American identity and is embodied in the Constitution: the
story of intrepid settlers and pioneers that left the oppression of
European imperialism, classism, and religious intolerance to create a
new nation founded upon liberty, equality, and freedom.3 9 In that
sense, constitutionalism serves the goal of nationalism by offering a
"super-identity" that trumps "all other identities. "4°
The effort of our pluralistic democracy has been to organize a na-
tion of "Americans," rather than to validate or perpetuate the differ-
ences among constituent citizens. Movements such as "English-Only"
trumpet the value of cultural uniformity at the governmental or "pub-
lic" level. There is a movement to accept cultural differences at the
"private" level, but to insist upon some uniform notion of "citizen-
ship" that can serve as the foundation for agreement at the "public"
level. It is unclear, however, that this ideal of "citizenship" is one that
can encompass groups with different notions of identity.
B. Pluralism and Democracy
According to Dalia Tsuk, contemporary political science and legal
scholarship associates the term "pluralism" with process theories of
37 Id.
See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539 (1988). I acknowledge that theorists differ in their
interpretations of republicanism, but I draw on Professor Sunstein's appraisal that republican
theories unite around four central commitments: deliberation, political equality, universalism,
and citizenship. See id. at 1548.
39 As Russell Barsh and James Henderson note: "For Americans the Constitution is not
merely a compact. It is imbued with an aura of uniqueness, and the history of its formation is
the closest approximation to a myth of American national origin." See RUSSELL. BARSH &JAMES
Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERIY 273 (1980).
40 Lawrence M. Friedman, Introduction: Nationalism, Identity, and Law, 28 IND. L. REV. 503,
506 (1995).
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democracy, which recognize a conception of a "neutral political pro-
cess, free of any substantive commitment to particular values such as
the celebration of diversity, in which different groups interact, com-
pete, or trade ends. 41 Professor Tsuk compares early twentieth cen-
tury theories of pluralism, which recognized diversity as a "constitu-
tive element of American democracy." Under this view, "the extent
to which laws and policies sought to accommodate and promote di-
verse group interests, beyond the sheer recognition of their exis-
tence, reflected a nation's commitment to democratic values."42 Pro-
fessor Tsuk asserts that Felix Cohen was committed to this view of
pluralism, which structured his interpretation of federal Indian law
during the New Deal years of Indian policy.
Professor Tsuk elaborates three models of pluralism which in-
formed this policy. "Socialist pluralism" was Cohen's initial model,
grounded in a critique of the absolute sovereignty of the state and in
a description of society as composed of a variety of self-governing
groups (e.g., religious groups, labor unions) coordinated by a cen-
tralized government. Under this model, conflicts between diverse in-
terests would be reconciled within a unitary legal system. This model
was the inspiration for the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which
permitted Indian tribes to form constitutional governments under
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior.
Over time, Cohen developed a view of "systematic pluralism,"
which recognized the multiplicity of group interests and value sys-
tems. The diverse ethnic groups of America had a right to bring their
value systems into the American polity. Because of this, the legal sys-
tem ought to be flexible enough to encompass the values and as-
sumptions of other systems. The fulfillment of this ideal of systematic
pluralism required a commitment to group rights. According to Pro-
fessor Tsuk, this model provided the impetus for Cohen's Handbook
of Indian Law, which recognized that special rights could be granted
to American Indians and effectuated by congressional control over
Indian affairs.
The third model was that of "comparative pluralism." This model
also endorsed the multiple interests of different groups as valid, but
sought to reconcile conflicting value systems not by extending one
system to include others, but by encouraging dialogue between and
among distinct systems. This model provided the foundation for the
legislation such as the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, which
was intended to settle the historical and cultural differences between
41 Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 189, 190
(2001) (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT (1967); ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956)).
42Id.
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Indian tribes and American society, and to provide a forum for In-
dian tribes to tell their narratives of American history.
Significantly, Professor Tsuk's account of pluralism and democ-
racy highlights the development of both political pluralism and cul-
tural pluralism. Political pluralism rejected the notion of an absolute
sovereignty in favor of the view that "sovereignty was distributed
among different groups.., such as churches, trade unions," and
even business corporations. Political pluralists advocated a func-
tional concept of political representation in order to protect the
needs of distinct associations. Cultural pluralists, on the other hand,
specifically rejected the "melting pot" ideology of early 20th century
policymakers, arguing that diverse cultural groups would make a sig-
nificant contribution to the western democratic tradition. Cultural
pluralists explored mechanisms that would accommodate the distinc-
tive cultural heritage of racial and ethnic groups, maintaining that
this was central to the identity of individuals from those groups. Both
cultural and political pluralists envisioned groups as "repositories of
particular ends that policymakers needed to recognize.
"44
C. Multicultural Citizenship and Democracy
According to William Galston, responsible citizenship requires
four types of civic virtues: (1) general virtues, such as courage, loyalty,
and the will to obey the law; (2) social virtues, such as independence
and the ability to keep an open mind; (3) economic virtues, includ-
ing a strong work ethic and ability to adapt to economic and techno-
logical change; and (4) political virtues, including the capacity to dis-
cern and respect the rights of others and the willingness to engage in
public discourse. According to Kymlicka and Norman, there is
widespread agreement that these are positive qualities, although
theorists differ on the public policy implications of this list of virtues.
Should the government act to ensure that citizens share a sense of
membership and belonging in the political community? Should the
government act to prevent citizens from balkanizing into adverse
groups, which could endanger this sense of unitary membership?
Given the centrality of group identity within pluralist society, these
concerns are particularly problematic.
Moreover, what are the implications of civic virtue for groups that
have suffered a historical legacy of oppression and injustice? Kym-
licka and Norman survey the literature on ethnic conflict in plural-
istic societies to assert that governments typically regulate such con-
43 Id. at 201.
44 Id. at 202.
45 Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 1, at 7.
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duct through efforts to eliminate differences (including genocide, as-
similation, and relocation) or efforts to manage differences.46 The his-
tory of relations between Native people and the United States gov-
ernment is replete with examples of the former: the United States
military campaigns against Indian nations, the forced relocation of
Native groups from their traditional homelands, and the forcible as-
similation of Native people through boarding school policies and
Christianization. However, the United States has also attempted to
manage differences through "hegemonic control" of Native peoples
(e.g., through use of the "federal plenary" power) and through vari-
ous modes of "multicultural integration" (e.g., the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act and federal relocation programs).
Kymlicka and Norman assert that we should move beyond these
views on reconciling ethnic conflict to carefully examine the relation-
ship between minority rights and citizenship, focusing on three key
questions. First, what is the impact of minority rights on the norms of
democratic citizenship? Second, what is the underlying logic of
claims for minority rights, and does this logic pose an "undesirable
absolutist or non-negotiable conception of culture and identity"?
And finally, to the extent that conflict exists between minority rights
and democratic citizenship, what "tradeoffs between these values are
appropriate and morally defensible?
4
1
These questions will most likely trigger different responses de-
pending upon the underlying value system used to evaluate these in-
quiries. For example, theorists from the divergent perspectives of
"liberal republicanism" and "interest group liberalism" have radically
different views on the nature of multicultural citizenship and group
rights in a pluralistic society. For example, Professor Cynthia Ward
points out that the ideal of republican citizenship entails a "belief in
the consensual possibilities of deliberative dialogue," and argues that
any effort to incorporate "disadvantaged groups" into the polity "as
separate entities" will defeat the most basic purpose of republicanism:
"to promote the interconnectedness of all citizens and their ability to
arrive at a collective definition of the common good, which the state
then implements." 4
On the other hand, Ward suggests that interest group liberalism
rejects the notion of "citizen virtue and participation" which under-
lies republicanism, and shifts the "burden of support for democ-
racy.., from the individual citizen to organized interest groups. '49
Id. at 12.
47 Id. at 17.
48 Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of "Liberal Republicanism": Why Group-Based Remedies and Repub-
lican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 583-85 (1991).
49 Id. at 590 (quoting MICHAEL MARGOLIS, VIABLE DEMOCRACY 99 (1979)).
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According to Ward, pluralist theory holds that "as long as all relevant
groups have equal access to the democratic process, they should be
allowed to battle among themselves for whatever benefits are forth-
coming from the state."5 Not surprisingly, Ward finds that interest
group liberalism engenders balkanization among citizens, including a
denial of "connectedness" and an attitude of competitive negotiation
and alienation. In short, according to Ward, "[i]nterest-group liber-
alism is not merely in conflict with republican community, it destroys
such community."
Professor Ward argues that "group representation" in the Ameri-
can polity is "deeply destructive of successful republican community,"
and that "group-based separatism" is ultimately irreconcilable with
"visions of national community."52 Although she does not discuss in-
digenous peoples' claims specifically, her approach suggests that the
increasing focus on group or tribal identity as separate from national
identity carries grave consequences for republican ideals of citizen-
ship and community. Before engaging the question of how indige-
nous peoples' claims for "dual citizenship" can be reconciled within
American constitutional tradition, I will explore the nature of tribal-
ism and the significance of indigenous peoples' contemporary claims
for "self-determination."
III. TRIBALISM, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' IDENTITY
In the United States, as in pluralistic societies across the globe,
ethnic groups are striving to assert their own identities as distinct
from the homogenizing influence of the national identity.53 Scholars
claim that the search for a distinctive ethnic identity is a "product of
modernity," a way to overcome a colonial history of domination and
oppression. The assimilationist focus of nationalism is increasingly
attacked as a movement that is biased against groups whose cultures
differ from that of the majority group. In line with Ward's critique of
"interest-group liberalism," however, identity claims are frequently
seen as disruptive and potentially destructive of the democracy's uni-
50 Id. at 591.
51 Id. at 597.
52 Id. at 606-07.
53 Friedman, supra note 40, at 506 (discussing how individuals in pluralistic societies identify
themselves more with their "sub-group" than with the nation as a whole).
See id. at 508; see also Richard W. Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal
Construction of Native American Tribal Identity, 28 IND. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995) (describing the
nation as "an artifact of the ... discourse peculiar to modernity").
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form and beneficial social and political goals. 55 Movements to define
ethnic identity in a political sense are often equated with "tribalism."
The term "tribalism" is frequently used pejoratively to refer to the
negative aspects of ethnic "balkanization" and political resistance. 56
But what do we mean by "tribalism" and how does tribalism correlate
to the formation of ethnopolitical identity?
A. Tribalism and Political Identity
Tribalism is troubling to contemporary nation-states because it
represents an alternative structure that enables its members to realize
their own political identities as separate from that of the nation-state.
This represents a movement away from the institution of the nation-
state to an alternative conception of a multicultural federation of di-
verse groups engaged in relations of mutuality and reciprocity, rather
57than political control and domination. In fact, in America, the per-
sistence of Indian nations has depended upon their separation from
the larger civic culture of the United States.58 Thus, in the words of
Professor Charles Wilkinson, the "constitutional status of tribalism"
depends upon a "measured separatism" between the Indian nations
and the United States.59
Tribalism can be considered the essence of Native American po-
litical existence. Indian nations hold to collective values and struc-
tures, continuing to exist as separate societies with functioning gov-
ernmental systems. The cultural worldviews that structure tribal
societies often place an emphasis upon understanding the appropri-
ate relationships between individuals, nations, and between human
beings and other aspects of the natural world.6° Native cultures often
resist notions of hierarchy and authoritarian control, and emphasize
notions of mutuality, reciprocity, and balance.6' The place of the in-
dividual within tribal society may look quite different than the place
of the individual within the larger "civil society." Notions of rights
55 For a popular critique of the "politics of difference" see Shelby Steele, The New Sovereignty:
Grievance Groups Have Become Nations unto Themselves, HARPER'S MAG.,July 1992, at 47.
56 Perry, supra note 54, at 553.
57 On this general point, James Tully offers an excellent account of how constitutionalism
might be restructured to recognize the demands of various groups for recognition. JAMES
TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLIcr: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSrIY (1995).
5s SeeWLKINSON, supra note 2, at 6.
9 Id.
60 For a commentary on the cultural content of tribal sovereignty, see Wallace Coffey & Re-
becca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future
of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 191 (2001).
61 See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225 (1996) (discussing the
implications of these norms on tribal environmental decision-making).
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and responsibilities, after all, are culturally constructed. Importantly,
the commitment to tribalism encompasses a concept of rights,
though not necessarily one centered around the individual. Under
many Native American concepts of tribalism, for example, the indi-
vidual does not "exist isolated from others in some mythic, disorgan-
ized state of nature" which would justify a concept of rights as limita-
tions upon governmental power over the individual. Instead, as
Professor Robert Clinton observes, in societies organized around a
"closely linked and integrated network of family, kinship, social and
political relations," these relationships define "one's personal identity
and one's rights and responsibilities exist only within the framework
of such familial, social and tribal networks."63
This "internal" construction of Native sovereignty, as a system of
rights, duties, and responsibilities within familial, social, and tribal
networks would most likely be unremarkable for the enterprise of
civil society if one could limit individuals' interactions as "tribal
members" to a "private sphere" and demand adherence to a universal
conception of "citizenship" in the "public sphere." Although this
type of configuration might work for certain ethnic groups, it is not a
realistic structure for indigenous peoples.6'
Indigenous peoples' claims stem from their unique historical and
legal status as sovereign governments with territorial boundaries, who
were colonized by European powers and subjected to political and
cultural domination. The history of relations between Native people
and European powers is unlike that of any other two groups, and
poses a unique challenge for multiculturalism. Michael Walzer char-
acterizes indigenous peoples' status as "somewhere between a captive
nation and a national, ethnic, or religious minority."" He claims that
"[s] omething more than equal citizenship is due them, some degree
of collective self-rule, but exactly what this might mean in practice
will depend on the residual strength of their own institutions and on
the character of their engagement in the common life of the larger
society. ' 66
Walzer acknowledges that there are "many conceivable arrange-
ments between dominance and detribalization and between domi-
nance and separation-and there are moral and political reasons for
Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
739, 742 (1990).
63 Id.
64 It is beyond the scope of this essay, for example, to discuss claims by groups who voluntar-
ily immigrated to the United States (e.g., Italian-Americans), but seek to preserve their identity
as distinct cultural groups.
65 Michael Walzer, The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem, 1992 DISSENT 164, 167.
6 Id.
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• ,,67choosing different arrangements in different circumstances. Un-
der Walzer's view, tribalism spans a continuum between "separatism"
as distinct governments and full incorporation as "citizens" ("detri-
balization"). Importantly, full assimilation as citizens within civil so-
ciety represents the destruction of the tribe as a separate political en-
tity. Walzer finds that to the extent that the ethnic group is perceived
to accept the authority of the "neutral state" and share its "character-
less citizenship," the group's individual identity becomes subordi-
nated to the common enterprise in a way that obviates any need to
recognize its separate status.
Walzer's theoretical appraisal is well supported by history. In the
late 19th century, Congress pursued a policy of extending citizenship
to Indians selectively through treaties and statutes.6s Such provisions
generally conditioned citizenship upon the Indians' willingness to
renounce their tribal culture and traditions and to conform their be-
havior to the dominant society's norms.69 Moreover, as descendants
of the historic Mashpee Tribe discovered, assimilation within non-
Indian institutions and society over time risks a legal finding of "de-
tribalization" and concomitant lack of a separate cultural or political
identity. In the Mashpee case, a federal court decided whether the
Mashpee existed as an "Indian tribe" at various relevant periods in
history, as well as the modern era, for purposes of their claim to lands
taken by the state of Massachusetts in violation of the Trade and In-
tercourse Acts. 70 A jury of non-Indian citizens decided the question
of Mashpee tribal status under a four part test,7' which asks: (1)
whether the Indians are of the same or a similar race; (2) whether
they are united in a community; (3) whether they are directed by one
leadership system or government; and (4) whether they inhabit a par-
ticular territory. In the minds of the non-Indian jurors, the Mashpee
did not comprise a distinct "Indian community" because of their ap-
parent racial and cultural assimilation within the local white and Afri-
can-American communities, nor did they appear to possess the conti-
nuity of political leadership and distinct institutional structures that
would support a finding of separate political identity. In other words,
by becoming "detribalized," the Mashpee lost their distinctive politi-
cal identity as well as any legal claim that they might have once pos-
sessed to their ancestral lands.
67 Id. at 166.
6s DAVID A. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 164 (4th ed.
1998).
69Id.
70 Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), afj"d sub nom.
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (lst Cir. 1979).
71 The test is drawn from Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
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The Mashpee case represents a situation where the Indian nation
lost its political status as a separate "tribe" and consequently lost its
land claims case. Under the United States Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence, a tribe can also lose its governmental authority if the tribe's
lands are perceived to have lost their "Indian character," either be-
cause significant numbers of non-Indians reside on the land, or be-
cause the lands have become industrialized or developed in a way
that appears inconsistent with the "traditional" uses of the land.7 In
both cases, courts interpret the tribes' loss of complete separation as
resulting in a loss of tribal identity or political autonomy.
Thus, "separatism" appears necessary for tribal survival. The ques-
tion, therefore, becomes how to adjudicate between dominance and
separation. The most problematic aspect of this debate centers
around the external features of tribalism-that is, how tribes should
relate to the larger nation-state, and how tribal members might adju-
dicate their claims both as tribal and national citizens. Although
much could be written about the external features of tribalism, this
essay will focus on one overarching claim that has been made by a
wide variety of indigenous groups: the claim for recognition of a po-
litical right to self-determination.
B. Indigenous Peoples' Claims to Self-Determination
The international movement among indigenous peoples to estab-
lish their rights has focused on human rights principles.' In particu-
lar, indigenous peoples seek international recognition of their status
as "peoples" with a right of self-determination. As outlined by S.
James Anaya, "self-determination is identified as a universe of human
rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples.., and grounded in
the idea that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies."74
The principle of self-determination is encompassed within Article 1
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By
72 See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (applying the test to determine that the Uin-
tah reservation had been diminished); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (finding that the tribe had lost its authority to zone lands
within the reservation which had a substantial percentage of non-Indian ownership and were
used for commercial and industrial purposes rather than traditional tribal uses such as hunting
and gathering); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (holding that a reservation may become
"diminished" to the point where the tribe loses governmental authority over the lands if the
area has lost its "Indian character"). These cases are discussed in detail in the next Part of this
article.
73 For a full account of this movement, see ANAYA, supra note 30, at 39-58.
74 Id. at 75.
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virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
' 5
The ideals of group autonomy and self-definition represented by
the principle of self-determination appeal to indigenous peoples,
who, in many cases, have labored under colonial domination for sev-
eral centuries. However, the nation-states have hesitated to recognize
indigenous groups as "peoples" for purposes of Article 1 of the Inter-
national Covenant, fearing that this might cause political destabiliza-
tion and trigger movements toward secession. Instead, indigenous
peoples have been treated as holders of "minority rights" under Arti-
cle 27 of the Covenant. Article 27 guarantees ethnic minorities the
right "in community with other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language." Article 27 guarantees cultural rights, while Ar-
ticle 1 focuses on political rights. The goal of tribalism is to affirm
both sets of rights vis a vis the larger nation-states.
The principle of group self-determination is also appealing to in-
digenous peoples because it responds to their notions of collective
identity. In that sense, the concept of self-determination appears to
bridge the gap between the individualistic focus of liberalism and the
group focus of tribalism.77 As Professor Anaya observes, the principle
of self-determination, as it is linked to "peoples" focuses on human
beings not only as autonomous individuals, but as social actors oper-
ating in communities and embedded in complex interrelationships
with others. 78 In that sense, self-determination also responds to a cen-
tral theme of republicanism, which is the realization that individuals,
as political actors (e.g., citizens), operate within communities to
achieve common goals. Interestingly, the reticence of nations to rec-
ognize indigenous groups as "peoples" parallels the arguments
against "interest group liberalism" as a means of adjudicating group
claims within civil society. Opponents of indigenous self-
determination argue that recognition of such a right will destroy the
collective enterprise of the nation-state, and will trigger attempts at
secession, partition and "ethnic cleansing."79
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
76 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 27, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 and approved by the United States Sept. 8,
1992).
77 l recognize that more work needs to be done to illuminate the concept of self-
determination as it applies to individuals and to groups under liberal theory and probe the pos-
sible disjunctions, but I reserve that project for another day.
78 ANAYA, supra note 30, at 77.
79 See, e.g., James A. Graff, Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-Determination, in GROUP
RIGHTS 186 (Judith Baker ed., 1994) (discussing the dangers facing newly defined ethnic poli-
tics in its search for self-determination).
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The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples seeks to explicate a right of self-determination for in-
digenous peoples, and this document has been instrumental in fur-
thering the discussion as to whether and to what extent the principle
of self-determination should apply to indigenous peoples. 8 Without
getting into that complex debate, I acknowledge the possibility that-
in line with Walzer's appraisal of tribalism-the unique position of
indigenous peoples may justify an alternative interpretation of self-
determination. For example, some commentators suggest that the
practical objectives of indigenous groups will be best met by having
their right to "internal autonomy" (e.g., self-government) protected,
rather than encouraging them to form independent states in the "ex-
ternal" manifestation of self-determination. Others disagree, assert-
ing that such an interpretation perpetuates "the distinction between
the rights of indigenous peoples and the rights of other peoples-a
distinction which indigenous leaders have long condemned as rac-
ist."82  The differences among indigenous peoples, with respect to
their historical, legal and cultural status, make it difficult to construct
a uniform principle applicable to each and every indigenous group,83
and so the debate over indigenous self-determination continues,
primarily in the context of the Draft Declaration.
Notably, the concept of indigenous self-determination is inclusive
of political claims, land claims," and claims for cultural survival. Due
to the importance of land and resources for Native peoples, an in-
digenous right to self-determination represents a political argument
for sovereignty and self-governance, a normative argument for in-
digenous control of land and resources, and a cultural argument for
the right to perpetuate Native customs and institutions, even where
these diverge from those of the larger nation-state. For indigenous
peoples, the battles for land and territory have cultural and political
80 Article 3 of the Draft Declaration, for example, provides that "Indigenous peoples have
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." ANAYA, supra note 30, at
209.
81 See Russell L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law,
7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 36 n.l (1994) (noting that this is the approach endorsed by the In-
ternational Labour Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169, which
"ensures indigenous peoples' control over their legal status, institutions, lands, and develop-
ment, but stops short of recognizing the right to secede").
82 Id.
One important difference, for example, is that in some countries (e.g., the United States
and Canada), the nation-state entered treaties with some (though not all) groups of indigenous
peoples. This historical fact has given rise to the concept of "treaty federalism" as one way to
structure the political relations between the respective groups. See, e.g., Monette, supra note 26.
84 See ANAYA, supra note 30, at 104-07 (discussing the importance of lands and resources to
the survival of indigenous cultures and to indigenous self-determination).
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dimensions which cannot be captured in isolation from one another.
Moreover, international law appears to support an argument for in-
digenous self-determination based on principles of justice, though
exactly what this entails is beyond the scope of this essay.s
5
Some commentators have suggested that assertions of self-
determination by ethnocultural groups "would seem to posit ethnicity
over citizenship as the basis of politically significant loyalties." 6 Un-
der this view, self-determination is incommensurate with citizenship
in the larger nation-state. However, I would argue that indigenous
peoples' claims for self-determination are different from those of
many other groups, and it is possible that tribalism can be harmo-
nized with concepts of rights, duties, and responsibilities which are
reflected in liberal theory and American constitutionalism. This may
prove to be the case, for example, if the values embodied within self-
determination can be understood to establish a foundation for politi-
cal interactions between indigenous peoples and the nation-states.
8 7
In most cases, indigenous groups seek to remain in a political alliance
with the nation-state. The primary goal is to establish a basis for this
political relationship that does not engage the historical cycle of con-
quest, oppression, and domination.
Indigenous peoples' claims for self-determination operate at the
apex of the global political structure-the international domain
which establishes the rights of nations, states and "peoples." The
concept of "tribalism" operates at a different level-within the nation-
state which orders the operation of civil society. In resolving the ten-
sion between tribalism and constitutionalism, then, it is important to
examine the Court's struggle to accommodate tribal rights within the
jurisprudential structure that governs our general understanding of
"rights" within the normative framework of American constitutional-
ism.
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRIBALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
DOMESTIC LAW: A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
The political identity of Indian tribes depends, fundamentally, on
their "separateness." The key to ajudicial finding of "detribalization"
is generally "assimilation"-cultural and/or political-with the sur-
85 Professor Tes6n, for example, offers an excellent account of "injustice" as a
justification for group rights to self-determination. See FERNANDO R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-56 (1998).
86 See Graff, supra note 79, at 208.
87 Significantly, the values of autonomy, liberty, property, justice, and respect are embodied
within indigenous peoples' claims for self-determination, suggesting that these values are of
universal importance to "peoples," though they might be adjudicated differently within differ-
ent structures.
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rounding non-Indian population. Thus, tribalism rests on the per-
ceived "difference" of Indian nations from the surrounding states.
Unfortunately, "difference" also carries a normative connotation,
which inspires distrust of tribal governments among policy makers
and non-Indian citizens. Professor Robert Williams, for example, has
linked the political discourse of the Removal Era with that of con-
temporary policy makers who have revived "an uncompromising and
racist legal discourse of opposition to tribal sovereignty" to seek the
virtual elimination of tribalism from the United States."
This rhetoric is also present in many contemporary cases dealing
with reservation diminishment and tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. In this respect, it is important to consider a major argument
against tribalism: that tribalism contravenes fundamental liberal
norms of political organization necessary for the flourishing of a con-
stitutional democracy. Under this view, a political structure that rec-
ognizes a group's separate political identity conflicts with central or-
ganizational ideals of constitutionalism, which affirm citizens'
individual identities. The notion of group or collective rights, in par-
ticular, appears inconsistent with constitutional norms of liberty and
individual freedom.8 9 This Part of the article will first examine the
normative implications of "tribalism" and "separatism" within Ameri-
can jurisprudence, which underlie efforts to curtail tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers, and then evaluate the federal courts' attempts to
accommodate pluralism and cultural rights in several categories of
cases.
A. The Normative Implications of "Tribalism" and "Separatism" Within
American Jurisprudence
Due to the allotment policy of the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, many reservations today are comprised of mixed land ownership:
tribal trust land, trust allotments held by individual tribal members,
and non-Indian owned fee land.90 This lack of territorial integrity,
88 Williams, supra note 24.
89 On a related point, see TES6N, supra note 85, at 128 (noting the hesitancy of liberal the-
ory to recognize "assertions of rights held by collective entities because it is unclear what func-
tion they perform in normative political theory," and specifically because "it is unclear whether
or not group rights can coexist with individual rights"). Professor Tes6n argues for a liberal
theory of self-determination premised on principles ofjustice and individual human rights.
90 For a general discussion of the allotment policy, see VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M.
LYrLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICANJUSTICE 8-10, 14 (1983). As Professors Deloria and Lytle
note, under the allotment policy, Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres in
1887 to 52 million in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act was passed, ending the allot-
ment policy. Id. at 8. Indian nations continue to struggle with the difficult legacy of this policy,
including fractionated heirships and a "checkerboard" pattern of fee and trust allotments,
which complicate efficient land use and cause jurisdictional problems.
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however, does not seem to be the driving force for the Supreme
Court's opinions dealing with diminishment of reservation bounda-
ries and lack of tribal jurisdiction. Rather, the fundamental problem
appears to be the Court's discomfort with tribal governments exercis-
ing authority over non-Indian citizens.
In 1987, Professor Charles Wilkinson identified one of the most
perplexing questions arising from the "constitutional status of tribal-
ism": even though the separate landbase of Indian nations is guaran-
teed to them by law, "how can the United States, consistent with its
democratic ideals, allow... Indian tribes to govern the non-Indians
who have lawfully entered those lands to live and to do business over
the course of ensuing generations?" '91 Professor Wilkinson observed
that many of the "most perplexing problems in Indian law involve the
rights of non-Indians, especially residents in Indian country. ' 92 Non-
Indian residents raise a variety of objections to tribal jurisdiction, of-
ten claiming that they are the victims of unfairness because they can-
not participate in the tribe's political governance and that they never
consented to such governance merely by accepting homestead rights
under the federal government's public land policies." The fact that
tribal court decisions are not generally subject to federal review 4 adds
another layer of opposition related to the claim that non-Indians who
are discriminated against have no recourse in outside courts. Moreo-
ver, many claimants may face the bar of tribal sovereign immunity to
lawsuits against the tribe.9
These objections have inspired both legislative and judicial atten-
tion. For example, former Washington State Senator Slade Gorton
was persistent in his efforts to curtail tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians and permit claimants to sue tribal governments in federal
court.96 The federal courts have partially accomplished these goals by
more liberal constructions of congressional intent in diminishing
"Indian Country" and by increasingly narrowing the scope of what is
perceived to be an attribute of "inherent" tribal sovereignty. Indeed,
Professor Wilkinson's 1987 observation has proved prophetic: "If
non-Indians have no recourse against tribal governments, then inevi-
tably in close cases judges will be tempted simply to eliminate the po-
tential unfairness to non-Indians by holding that tribal jurisdiction
91 wILKINsON, supra note 2, at 6.
9 Id. at 111.
93ld93Id.
94 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
95 As autonomous governments, Indian nations possess "sovereign immunity," which means
that "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe
has waived its immunity." SeeKiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753 (1998).
96 American Indian EqualJustice Act, S.1691, 105th Cong. §§ 1-2 (1998).
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does not exist in the first place."97 The truth of this statement is ap-
parent in cases dealing with diminishment of "Indian Country," as
well as attempts to establish "implied"jurisdictional limitations on the
authority of Indian nations to regulate non-Indians.
1. Diminishment of Indian Country
One means to curtail tribal jurisdiction is to find that "Indian
Country" no longer exists; in other words, that the reservation has
been diminished or disestablished. Although theoretically only Con-
gress has the power to disestablish a reservation, the Court has be-
come somewhat activist in inferring such intent from ambiguous cir-
cumstances. Perhaps the most problematic test is that of "de facto
diminishment." In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court found that "who actu-
ally moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation."9 8 Citing the
factual context of earlier cases, the Court found that "[w]here non-
Indian settlers flooded into the open portion of a reservation and the
area has long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged
that defacto, if not dejure, diminishment may have occurred."9
The de facto diminishment test is reminiscent of Justice McLean's
reasoning in Worcester supporting the end of tribalism through the
loss of "Indian character" and the eventuality of state jurisdiction.
The de facto diminishment test accomplished little in the hands of
Supreme Court Justices like Thurgood Marshall, who applied the test
in accordance with canons of construction and refused to find dimin-
ishment on an ambiguous record of Congressional intent. However,
in the hands of Supreme Court Justices like O'Connor, Scalia, and
Rehnquist, the test has received a new importance. In Hagen v. Utah,
the Supreme Court examined possibly the most ambiguous record of
Congressional intent to date and found that the Uintah Reservation
had been diminished when it was opened for settlement by non-
Indians by a 1905 statute.1 ° While O'Connor purported to apply the
same three-part test articulated in Solem v. Bartlett, which examined
the statutory language, the historical context of the Surplus Land Act,
and who actually moved onto the opened land, it became apparent
that the Court's primary concern was over the governance of the
many non-Indians in the area.
Building on language in Solem v. Bartlett, O'Connor found that
when an area is predominately populated by non-Indians, a "finding
97 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 112.
465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984).
99 Id.
100 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
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that the land remains Indian Country seriously burdens the admini-
stration of state and local governments."'0 ' Here, O'Connor noted,
the most current census demonstrated that the area was 85% non-
102Indian and the largest city in the area was 93% non-Indian. These
statistics, combined with the fact that the state had exercised jurisdic-
tion within the area, demonstrated "a practical acknowledgement
that the Reservation was diminished" and led the Court to claim that
a contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expecta-
tions of the people living in the area."' 3 Similarly, in South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court employed a broad reading of the di-
minishment doctrine to find that the Yankton Sioux Tribe could not
exercise environmental regulatory jurisdiction over reservation lands
alienated from tribal ownership because those lands are no longer
"Indian Country." '04 Although the Court's decision was based on a
technical construction of historical documentation, it had a very real
effect on the tribal community. The Court's decision removed the
existing federal-tribal regulatory oversight and authorized the state of
South Dakota to apply its more lenient regulations to a landfill that
posed a risk to adjacent tribal residents. The diminishment question
is an ongoing issue for tribes whose reservations were heavily allotted,
particularly where a substantial percentage of the allotments has
passed into non-Indian ownership. Thus, the Court's current direc-
tion in diminishment cases appears directly in line with Justice
McLean's view of the temporary nature of tribalism.
2. The Diminished Sovereignty Analysis
A second means to limit tribal jurisdiction is to find that the tribe
lacks the inherent sovereign power to exercise such jurisdiction and
that the federal government has not delegated to the tribe any
authority to exercise such jurisdiction. The effort to judicially recon-
ceptualize inherent tribal sovereignty, of course, is rooted in the
Court's 1978 opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.105 In that case,
the Court acknowledged that Indian tribes retain elements of "quasi-
sovereign" authority, yet found that the tribes are "prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their
status. ' 6 The Court in Oliphant held that the "overriding sover-
101 Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
103 Id.
104 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
1o5 See 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that the tribes' dependent status had implicitly divested
them of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
106 Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)).
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eignty" of the United States implicitly barred the Indian nations from
criminally prosecuting non-Indians who commit misdemeanors
against Indians on the reservation.'07 Importantly, the decision was
premised on the belief that the exercise of such jurisdiction would
pose an "unwarranted intrusion" on the personal liberty of non-
Indian citizens."8 Analogizing to the 1883 case of Ex parte Crow Dog,"',
which upheld exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an intra-Indian crime,
Rehnquist wrote that it would be unfair to subject non-Indians to a
criminal system founded upon an alien system of tribal custom and
procedure.1
As Professor Wilkinson notes, it is likely that the holding in
Oliphant was based on "Congress's perceived concern with the civil
liberties of United States citizens, and, one can surmise, on the Jus-
tices' own visceral reaction to the issue." ' This same solicitude for
non-Indian rights appears to be the basis of the Court's subsequent
decision in Montana v. United States, which held that the Crow Tribe
could not exercise hunting and fishing jurisdiction over non-Indians
on fee land within the reservation. 2 In this case, the Crow Tribe had
passed a regulation that prohibited nonmembers from hunting or
fishing within the reservation.
The Supreme Court found that regulation of hunting and fishing
by nonmembers on land not owned by the tribe "bears no clear rela-
tionship to tribal self-government or internal relations" and is there-
fore outside the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty." 3 The Court
appeared to favor the rights of nonmembers to engage in recrea-
tional activities over the rights of tribes to govern, which may seem
preposterous and inconsistent with the reasoning in Oliphant, which
was premised upon protection of non-Indians' fundamental liberty
interests. Yet to the extent that the Montana Court's decision is bol-
stered by arguments of discriminatory tribal regulation of nonmem-
ber residents, the need to maximize nonmembers' enjoyment of
property rights, and the need to validate nonmembers' expectation
interests in being governed by the state, rather than the tribe, the
Montana decision is completely consistent with Oliphant's position
against inherent tribal sovereignty.
The Montana decision has been supported by subsequent case law.
For example, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima In-
dian Nation, a badly split Court held that the tribe had been divested
107 Id. at 208-09.
108 Id. at 210.
109 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
110 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
HI WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 43.
112 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
13 Id. at 564.
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of zoning authority over nonmember fee land in the "open" portion
of the reservation, but retained such authority in the "closed" portion
of the reservation."4 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion found that the
tribe could maintain residual authority to zone nonmember fee land
only in the "closed" portion of the reservation because the tribe had
in effect reserved an "equitable servitude" over the land in the closed
area to preserve its "Indian Character." Significantly, population
demographics again played an important role. The land in the
"closed area" was overwhelmingly tribal in ownership, and further-
more, was quite pristine and used for traditional purposes. Almost
half of the land in the "open" area, by comparison, was in fee owner-
ship, and had a strong non-Indian presence and commercial charac-
ter. The Brendale opinion is another instance of Justice McLean's ar-
gument finding termination of tribal authority by "assimilation" and
loss of tribal presence. Moreover, Stevens' separate opinion in Bren-
dale, which distinguishes Montana as a case involving a "discrimina-
tory" tribal regulation indicates the importance of nonmembers' civil
rights, as well as their property rights, to the non-Indian justices who
decide these cases.115
The Court's opinion in Strate v. A-1 Contractors'6 continued the
conception of tribal sovereignty as one essentially limited to tribal
members. In the Strate case, a unanimous Court ruled that the Fort
Berthold tribe did not retain inherent authority to exercise adjudica-
tory jurisdiction over a tort lawsuit between non-Indians that arose
out of an auto accident on a state right-of-way on the reservation.
This was a matter purely for the state or federal courts to address.
Applying a much more limited reading of Montana, the Court held
that tribes do not retain inherent sovereignty to govern the conduct
of nonmembers on the reservation except where there is a clear con-
sensual (e.g., contractual) relationship between the nonmember and
the tribe, or where the tribe retains such a strong interest in the mat-
ter that exercise of such jurisdiction is necessary to tribal self-
government and exercise of state jurisdiction would "trench unduly
on tribal self-government.""' 7 The second part of the Montana test
supported tribal jurisdiction over matters that threaten or have a di-
rect effect upon "the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.""' Yet, under the Court's constrained
reading of this test, it seems as though in any case where the tribe is
merely making an argument for "concurrent" jurisdiction, the "ne-
114 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
115 Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"16 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
117 Id. at 458.
118 Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
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cessity" factor will not be met. For example, in the Strate case, the
Court found that the plaintiff could have her claim vindicated in ei-
ther state or tribal court, and therefore exercise of tribal jurisdiction
was not "necessary to protect tribal self-government."" 9 The Court's
assumption that further judicial constraint of tribal self-government
does not injure tribal self-government is hard to justify. Thus, had
the Court upheld concurrent jurisdiction and left it to plaintiffs to
choose either state or tribal jurisdiction, presumably a tribe could not
argue that it had been harmed by a plaintiffs choice to pursue the
claim in state court. Yet by using concurrent jurisdiction as proof of
lack of any tribal jurisdiction, important tribal governmental interests
in regulating traffic safety and enforcing protective laws within the
reservation are jeopardized. The tribe becomes dependent upon the
state to enforce such interests for the tribe.
Notably, the Court in Strate was careful to issue a very doctrinal
and narrow opinion that purports to place the factual situation
squarely within Montana as the central authority over what remains of
inherent sovereignty. Yet, as Oliphant recognized, only Congress can
divest the tribes of sovereignty."" There is no discussion in the Strate
case of overriding Congressional concerns about personal liberty,
discriminatory treatment, property rights, or any other important
Constitutional value. The case emerges from a decontextualized ju-
dicial vacuum, independent of notions of tribalism, constitutionalism,
or the unique relationship of Indian nations to the federal govern-
ment and the states.
Perhaps a more important inquiry, then, is what was the "subtext"
of Strate? What unarticulated judicial values allowed the Court to de-
cide as it did? Based on a reading of the transcript of oral argument
in the case, I would suggest that the justices were concerned about
two things. First, does tribal tort law approximate state tort law, and
if it does not or might not, how could one put a non-Indian motorist
on notice that he had now driven into a radically different legal sys-
tem and could be hauled into a "foreign" court? Second, assuming
that a tribal court took jurisdiction of the case, how would the non-
Indian defendant be protected from egregious bias, discrimination,
and unfair treatment when review by an outside court was not even
possible?...
19 Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
120 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
121 The reference at oral argument to the alleged egregious conduct in the Burlington North-
ern case, Burlington Northern Railroad v. Red Wolf, No. 96-35254, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6599
(9th Cir.Jan. 29, 1997), reaffirms my belief that this is an important, but unarticulated, subtext
to the Strate opinion. See United States Supreme Court Transcript at *28, Strate v. A-i Contrac-
tors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available at 1997 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 12 (quoting Pat-
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The Court's most recent opinions in Nevada v. Hiks122 and Atkin-
son Trading Co. v. Shirley12 continue this line of reasoning, and appear
to be premised on a similar set of concerns. In Atkinson, the Court
held that the Navajo Nation may not impose a hotel occupancy tax
on guests of a hotel located on fee lands within the Navajo Reserva-
tion. Drawing on Montana, the Court found that tribes generally lack
civil authority over nonmembers on reservation fee lands, and that
this general rule is likewise applicable in tax cases, even though the
Navajo Nation extended certain governmental services to benefit the
hotel and its guests. In the Hicks case, the Court held that the Fallon
Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a state official's alleged
tortious conduct in executing a search warrant on a trust allotment
within the reservation for an alleged off-reservation crime. Further-
more, the Court found that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to ad-
judicate the case as a federal civil rights claim under section 1983.
Significantly, the Court reasoned that the consequences of recogniz-
ing such jurisdiction would be intolerable because defendants in
tribal court would "lack the right available to state-court [section]
1983 defendants to seek a federal forum."124 Finally, the Court held
that such actions were to be litigated in state or federal court, and
that the state officials were not required to exhaust their remedies in
tribal court because this would "serve no purpose other than delay."25
Justice Souter's separate concurring opinion specifically details a
list of concerns about the potential unfairness of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, including the assertion that nonmembers have an
expectation interest in knowing where tribal jurisdiction begins and
ends, that Indian nations are not limited by the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the ICRA does not provide "identi-
cal guarantees" to the Bill of Rights, and that nonmember citizens
must be "protected... from unwarranted intrusions on their per-
sonal liberty." 6 In addition, Souter expressed concern that tribal law
may be unwritten and based on custom and tradition, and thus an
outsider would not be familiar with these norms."' Nor would the
litigant have access to an effective review mechanism to gauge the
fairness of the decision, given that tribal court decisions are not sub-
ject to federal review.' 28
rickJ. Ward for respondent saying that "[t]here was a parade of horribles in that case and an
extremely unfair verdict").
122 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
123 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
124 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 368.
125 Id. at 369 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)).
12 Id. at 384 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 385.
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The Hicks opinion demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to ac-
commodate pluralism by recognizing the legitimacy of tribal courts as
a forum for disputes between tribal members and non-Indians. This
article will next examine several categories of cases dealing with issues
regarding the accommodation of pluralism and cultural rights.
These cases demonstrate the discomfort of the courts in acknowledg-
ing group rights that stem from the unique status of Indian nations
because of their belief that such rights may conflict with individual
civil rights or may violate important constitutional norms of Ameri-
can society.
B. The Accommodation of Pluralism and Cultural Rights
Professor Wilkinson suggests that the federal courts should pro-
mote tribal governmental autonomy as part of their duty to fulfill
their traditional obligation of protecting minority rights. Under
this theory, limited federal judicial review and Congressional author-
ity over tribes may enable the Court to fulfill this obligation while still
respecting the rights of nonmembers subject to tribal authority. Wil-
kinson's proposal, however, may not adequately respond to tribal in-
terests in establishing some normative constraint on the federal legis-
lative or judicial power to limit tribal sovereignty. Thus, to the extent
that the Congress itself perceives tribal interests, values or legal prin-
ciples as contrary to powerful norms of a constitutional democracy,
there will be significant political pressure to curtail tribal rights.
Similarly, even where Congress has not formally bowed to such politi-
cal pressure, the Court may infer such "intent" from basic principles
of constitutionalism, as it did in the Oliphant case.
The discomfort of the federal courts with the normative basis of
tribalism is apparent in a range of cases trying to reach an accommo-
dation between pluralism and cultural rights. I will discuss several
categories of such cases, which raise both issues of "equality" of citi-
zenship and the justice of "special" group rights, and the perceived
conflict between group rights and individual rights.
1. Domestic Relations
Domestic relations has been an area in which Native American
rights have had to be addressed by special legislation. In response to
statistics indicating that over twenty-five percent of Indian children
had been removed from their families and placed with non-Indian
families, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978.'
31
129 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 118.
130 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 - 1963 (2000).
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The ICWA was designed to promote the best interests of Indian chil-
dren and to protect the cultural heritage of Indian nations from de-
struction through the removal of children from Indian tribes.
Although the ICWA has been criticized as a statute that favors
tribal control over parental control of Indian children, and one that
may not necessarily meet the "best interests" of the child, the Su-
preme Court upheld the statute against these arguments in the 1989
case of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield."'5 In the Holy-
field case, the Indian parents had intentionally left the reservation to
deliver their twin children and had then placed them for adoption
with a non-Indian family. The Supreme Court upheld the tribe's at-
tempt to vacate the adoption, holding that the domicile of the chil-
dren followed that of the parents, and because both parents were
domiciled on the reservation, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the placement of the children. The three dissenting justices
argued that the majority's opinion frustrated the clear intention of
the childrens' parents and would set aside an adoption, valid under
state law, that had resulted in the children residing with the Holy-
fields for three years."' The dissenting justices believed that Indian
parents should be able to defeat tribal jurisdiction without going to
the expense and trouble of establishing a domicile off the reserva-
tion."'
The ICWA inspires debate in part because it appears to subordi-
nate the individual parents' rights and interests to tribal interests.3
Some would also argue that the ICWA violates constitutional princi-
ples of equal protection by treating Indian children differently from
non-Indian children. While both systems would advocate the course
of action that is in the "best interests" of the child, the ICWA contains
several statutory constraints that guide application of this test. For
example, under the ICWA, the standard of proof for parental unfit-
ness is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than "clear and
convincing evidence." Moreover, the ICWA contains a distinct order
of preference for child placement for foster care and adoption that
favors placement with Indian families, particularly tribal members.35
The ICWA supports tribalism, and the judicial and scholarly cri-
tiques of the ICWA illustrate the tensions between tribalism and con-
stitutionalism. The tribe's rights under the ICWA are collective
131 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
132 Id. at 54 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 64 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
I'm See Donna Goldsmith, Individual v. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990) (examining the decision in Holyfield in light of the ICWA).
13b See 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000) (noting that the order of preference in adoptive placements
goes to (1) members of the child's extended family, (2) other members of the tribe, and then
(3) other Indian families).
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"group rights" that sometimes trump individual rights, such as the
right of an Indian parent domiciled on the reservation to subvert ex-
clusive tribal jurisdiction. One of the most extensive constitutional
critiques of the ICWA emerged in a California appellate court case, In
re Bridget R' 6 This case involved an Indian father and non-Indian
mother domiciled off the reservation who voluntarily gave their child
up for adoption to a non-Indian couple. The father had been coun-
seled to conceal his Indian identity to facilitate the adoption, and
therefore several statutory requirements of the ICWA were ignored,
presumably invalidating the parental consent. At the request of the
paternal grandmother, the tribe intervened to set aside the father's
relinquishment of parental rights.
The appellate court in the Bridget R. case found that under the
Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the
ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary termina-
tion of parental rights respecting an Indian child who is not domi-
ciled on the reservation, unless the child's biological parent or par-
ents are not only of American Indian descent but also maintain a
significant social, cultural, or political relationship with their tribe.
17
In other words, Indian parents who "assimilate" into the dominant
culture forfeit the protection of "tribalism" in defining special rights
for placement of their children.
The court's decision was built upon a judicially-created exception
to ICWA, the "existing Indian family doctrine," which holds that
ICWA is not applicable where the child is not being removed from an
"existing Indian family" because in such a case, the statute's purposes
are not triggered.' The court in the Bridget R case, however, moved
beyond this exception into an expanded constitutional critique of the
ICWA, finding that the ICWA poses Due Process, Equal Protection,
and Tenth Amendment problems to the extent that it is applied to
persons who have given up their social and cultural status as "tribal"
Indians.139
The analysis used by the court in the Bridget R. case is reminiscent
of Justice McLean's argument for termination of "tribalism" by as-
similation. Moreover, the court suggests that "detribalization" is an
appropriate matter for a state court to adjudicate, and, bolstered by
constitutional principle, serves as a limitation on federal power. Thus,
the court argues that even enrolled tribal members are not "Indians"
136 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
137 Id. at 516.
138 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992) (concerning the adoption of
a child whose mother was not fully aware of her Indian heritage); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,
643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (holding that a boy who was less than half Indian and born to a non-
Indian mother was not being taken from an Indian family).
13 49 Cal. Rptr. at 522-29.
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for purposes of the ICWA to the extent that they have become "detri-
balized" and that Congress may not constitutionally treat them this
way.
2. Religious Freedom
Religious freedom is another area where Congress has had to en-
act special legislation to protect tribal rights. Thus, the American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 specifies that it is "the policy of
the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise" their tra-
ditional religions.' 40 Although this language suggests that Native re-
ligions should receive statutory as well as constitutional protection,
the Supreme Court has failed to accept this interpretation. Rather,
the Court has refused to protect Native religious practices such as pe-
yote rituals and access to sacred sites under the First Amendment,
and has also found that the AIRFA does not offer any legally enforce-
able protection for Native religious practices.14 For example, in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Supreme Court
found that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the U.S. Forest
Service from constructing a road through a federally-owned wilder-
ness area that had traditionally been used for religious purposes by
several indigenous groups.14  Despite a finding that the road con-
struction would virtually destroy the ability of the Indian people to
practice their religion, Justice O'Connor held that the First Amend-
ment must "apply to all citizens alike, and it can give none of them a
veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of
religion."', By treating the government's road project as a com-
pletely neutral administrative decision regarding use of federally-
owned land, the Court was able to circumvent use of the compelling
interest test altogether. Thus, as the dissenting justices noted, the
Court essentially held that "federal land-use decisions that render the
practice of a given religion impossible do not burden that religion in
a manner cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause."'14
The Lyng case supports a broad degree of autonomy on the part
of the federal government to act for the common interests of citizens,
even to the extent that this offends the spiritual beliefs of some citi-
zens. Justice O'Connor wrote that the "Constitution does not... of-
140 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000).
141 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)
("Nowhere in the [AIRFA] is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or
anyjudicially enforceable individual rights.").
142 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
143 Id. at 452.
144 Id. at 459 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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fer to reconcile the various competing demands on government" that
arise from a pluralistic society.' 4' To do so in favor of the Indian
plaintiffs in this case, she claimed, would be to require "de facto bene-
ficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property."'
146
In other words, the Court's position is that majority values and inter-
ests take precedence on "public lands" regardless of the competing
values and interests of minority cultures. This isn't a constitutional is-
sue, but a governance issue that facilitates decision-making in a plural-
istic society.
DespiteJustice O'Connor's protests to the contrary, the Lyngdeci-
sion supported the Court's subsequent opinion in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which held that
the Free Exercise Clause does not pose a bar to state prohibitions on
sacramental peyote use by Native Americans. 141 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, declined to apply the compelling interest test to the
"government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct" through its criminal laws.' 8  Scalia ex-
pressed concern that conditioning an individual's obligation to con-
form to such a law upon "the law's coincidence with his religious be-
liefs" would permit the individual to "become a law unto himself."',
Such a result, wrote Scalia, "contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense. " 5°
Scalia's reading of "constitutional tradition" is majoritarian in fo-
cus. According to Scalia, any society using a compelling interest test
as a means of measuring governmental authority to infringe upon an
individual's religious interests would be "courting anarchy."' 5'
Moreover, he claimed "that danger increases in direct proportion to
the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to co-
erce or suppress none of them."5' Although his analysis is framed in
terms of liberal tolerance and equality, Scalia acknowledged that the
accommodation of religious practices, once taken out of the constitu-
tional interpretation of the courts, could only be addressed through
the "political process." Scalia further admitted that this would dis-
advantage "religious practices that are not widely engaged in," but
claimed "that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
145 Id. at 452.
146 Id. at 453.
147 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
148 Id. at 885.
149 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878)).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 888.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 890.
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must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs." 5 4
The view of religious freedom that emerges from Smith and Lyng
treats cultural pluralism as a matter of legislative "accommodation,"
rather than a constitutional requirement. By failing to consider tribal
religious interests as analogous to individual free exercise claims, the
Supreme Court facilitated the need for special legislation protecting
Native American religious practice. Thus, Congress amended the
AIRFA in 1994 to provide legal protection for Native Americans using
peyote for "bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes." 55 In 1996,
President Clinton signed an executive order requiring federal agen-
cies to "accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred
sites" by Native American practitioners "to the extent practicable,
permitted by law, and not clearly inconsistent with essential agency
functions.' 6 Finally, the Native American Graves Protection and Re-
patriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) prohibits the trade, transport, or
sale of Native American human remains and directs federal agencies
and federally-funded museums and institutions to identify such re-
mains and specific categories of cultural objects in their possession
and repatriate them to the tribes.157 Currently, the NAGPRA is under
attack in a federal district court case in which a group of scientists has
challenged the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to return a
set of ancient human remains, popularly known as "Kennewick Man,"
to a set of five tribes who claim this individual as their ancestor. 15s
The district court's recent opinion challenges the very foundation of
the repatriation statute in its findings that this ancient set of human
remains is not "Native American" and therefore, that NAGPRA does
not govern the disposition of the remains.159 The court disregarded
154 Id.
155 See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996a(b)(1) (1994).
156 Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 29, 1996).
157 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2000).
158 Bonnichsen v. United States Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997). After the
Army Corps of Engineers determined that the remains were affiliated to the claimant tribes and
should be returned, the court found that the Army Corps had not followed the requisite proce-
dures and remanded the case for further findings and a factual determination on the affiliation
of the remains to the claimant tribes. Id. On January 13, 2000, the Department of the Interior
(DOI) announced its final determination that the remains of the "Kennewick Man" are "Native
American" within the meaning of NAGPRA. Bonnichsen v. United States Dep't of the Army,
217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1130 (D. Or. 2002). After completing an extensive set of studies, the DOI
concluded that the remains were culturally affiliated to the claimant tribes and on September
25, 2000, the DOI issued its final decision awarding the remains to the five tribal claimants. Id.
The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint seeking review of these determinations. Id. at
1131.
159 Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
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the deference normally given to federal agency decision-making and
ordered that the remains be made available to plaintiffs for scientific
study.1 6° The opinion is being appealed by the DOI and by the claim-
ant tribes. The ultimate resolution of this case will provide a power-
ful indication of the status of Native peoples in this country and the
United States' commitment to pluralism.
3. Civil Rights
Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 as a means
to protect, by statute, certain fundamental rights of persons subject to
tribal jurisdiction. 61 As extraconstitutional entities, the Indian na-
tions are not bound by Constitutional provisions, such as the Bill of
Rights, that limit governmental power over individuals. 62 In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,l  the Supreme Court held that there is no
federal cause of action to enforce the provisions of the ICRA with the
exception of the express remedy of habeas corpus. The Martinez
case, which involved the tribe's power to define its membership crite-
ria in part on the basis of gender, inspired a heated controversy over
whether the civil rights of individuals could be adequately protected
without federal review, and whether the Court's refusal to enforce the
rights of a female tribal member to equal protection under tribal law
constituted an exception to the American norm of nondiscrimina-
tion.1 For the most part, these criticisms were confined to a fairly ac-
tive scholarly debate. Yet some recent federal decisions suggest a re-
newed effort on the part of the federal courts to intervene where
circumstances indicate that the tribal government engaged in unfair
or discriminatory treatment.
For example, in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, the
Second Circuit held that a tribe's order banishing several tribal
members from the reservation constituted a "criminal sanction" suffi-
cient to support exercise of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.' 6 Ac-
cording to the Court, the members had demonstrated a sufficiently
severe restraint on liberty to establish that they were in "custody."'
The dissenting judge criticized the majority's expansive definition of
160
161 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000).
162 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not apply to limit the powers of the tribes).
10 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
164 For a discussion of these critiques and the responses to them, see Rebecca Tsosie, Separate
Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy ofJustice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Ju-
risprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 495 (1994).
16 85 F.3d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 1996).
1 Id. at 894-98.
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the ICRA's habeas clause, particularly in reference to a matter purely
between tribal members. Yet it is clear that the majority was most
concerned with the tribal members' rights as United States' citizens
to be free of unwarranted intrusions upon their personal liberty, even
to the extent that the Court's protection for these rights would con-
flict with the tribe's views on who might appropriately be ordered to
leave the tribe.
4. Equal Protection
The area of equal protection jurisprudence is perhaps most prob-
lematic for courts trying to reconcile the rights of citizens in a consti-
tutional democracy with the rights of tribes and their members to
unique status and legal treatment.
A long history of treaty-making and an entire section of the
United States Code are premised on the status of tribal governments
as distinct political, rather than merely racial, entities. The Supreme
Court has interpreted this special status as justifying the often dispa-
rate treatment of Indians from non-Indians. 67  Moreover, the Court
has interpreted such a "political" classification as meriting rational
basis scrutiny, rather than the strict scrutiny given to racial classifica-
tions. 68 The result of these interpretations has been to broadly up-
hold the federal government's power to implement special laws for
tribes and their members against equal protection challenges from
disgruntled parties: both Indian and non-Indian. The norm of equal
protection still applies to legislation pertaining to Indian tribes,r yet
the Court must give increased deference to the federal government's
unique obligation to protect Indian tribes. Thus, "tribalism" qualifies
operation of a fundamental constitutional norm.
Yet, recent cases demonstrate the increasing discomfort of the
federal courts with special rights for Native Americans, particularly to
167 See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647-49 (1977) (holding that subjecting
Indian defendants to the stricter provisions of the federal Major Crimes Act rather than the
provisions of the comparable state murder statute presented no equal protection problem).
168 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' employment preference favoring Indians was directed toward Indians as a political
group, rather than a racial group, and could be justified under a rational basis test).
16 The norm of equal protection applies to tribal action, as well, after the enactment of the
Indian Civil Rights Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2000) (providing that an Indian tribe may not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws"). Significantly, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has ruled that this is an issue for tribal courts to determine, using their
own cultural construction of equal protection. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54
(1978) (drawing upon the lower court's reasoning that such a determination should be made
by the people of Santa Clara, "'not only because they can best decide what values are important,
but also because they must live with the decision every day'") (quoting Martinez v. Romney, 402
F. Supp. 5, 18-19 (D.N.M. 1975)).
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the extent that these are perceived to have negative consequences for
nonmembers. For example, in Williams v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit
held that an administrative agency's interpretation of the Reindeer
Industry Act as prohibiting reindeer herding by non-natives in Alaska
raised grave constitutional problems under the Equal Protection
Act."7 The court therefore interpreted the Act as permitting non-
natives in Alaska to own and import reindeer for commercial pur-
poses. To hold otherwise, ruled the court, would be to sanction a
government program that benefitted one racial group at the expense
of another. The court found that because reindeer are not indige-
nous to Alaska, there was no compelling interest in protecting cul-
tural survival. The court instead read the preference as a sort of af-
firmative action program to improve the economic status of the
Alaska Natives. Finally, the court queried whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,171 mandating
strict scrutiny for any racial classification, whether beneficial or dis-
criminatory, would undermine the political/racial distinction out-
lined in Morton v. Mancari.
The court's analysis in the Babbitt case suggests a movement to-
ward assimilation of Indian rights into the dominant norms of consti-
tutionalism, which favor the political majority. Moreover, the Babbitt
decision suggests that to the extent that Native activities are not tied
to aboriginal customs or traditions, they should not merit special
consideration as a means to facilitate tribalism. Nor is the reasoning
in Babbitt limited to cases in which the court perceives non-Indian
rights as being subordinated to Indian rights.
In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe may
not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian. 172 The
Court drew upon the analysis in Oliphant, yet was forced to acknowl-
edge that the historical context for tribal jurisdiction over Indians dif-
fered from that of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the majority, found that the analysis must take into
account the petitioner's current status as a U.S. citizen: "Indians like
other citizens are embraced within our Nation's 'great solicitude that
its citizens be protected.., from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty."'"7" The Court found that criminal trial and pun-
ishment constitutes a serious intrusion on the personal liberty of citi-
zens, and that by submitting to the overriding authority of the U.S.
government, tribes necessarily surrendered this power over all per-
170 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
171 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
l7 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
173 Id. at 692.
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sons except their .own tribal members. 74 The tribe's authority to
criminally regulate its members is "but a recognition of certain addi-
tional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be
tribal members."' 75 Although Congress has since amended the Indian
Civil Rights Act to confirm the fact that the retained sovereignty of
the tribes justifies their exercise of criminal jurisdiction over all Indi-
176ans, justice Kennedy's opinion raised some question as to whether
there were "constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress
to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribu-
nal that does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of
right.' 77 According to Kennedy, the statutory constraints of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act are not sufficient to protect the constitutional
rights of American citizens.' 78
The Duro case concerns the important intersection in federal In-
dian law jurisprudence between constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and protection of basic civil rights. In Duro, the Court
found that the only permissible distinction for purposes of equal pro-
tection would be one between tribal members and nonmembers, re-
gardless of other ethnic characteristics. This also coincided with the
Court's determination to protect the civil rights and liberties of
American citizens, whether "Indian" or "non-Indian." Congress,
however, in keeping with its tradition of treating all federally-
recognized Indian nations as equally situated with respect to sover-
eignty and jurisdiction, confirmed the inherent sovereign power of
Indian nations to criminally prosecute all Indian defendants. Al-
though some litigants have argued that this statute is in fact a delega-
tion of the federal government's power, rather than a confirmation
of inherent tribal sovereignty, the legislation has thus far withstood
such challenges.""
This article will conclude by examining some of the broader theo-
retical challenges of pluralism and multiculturalism posed by this
evaluation of the doctrinal case law.
174 Id. at 693.
175 Id.
176 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000).
177 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
178 Id.
179 The implications of this are important. If Congress delegated federal authority, then con-
current tribal and federal prosecutions would be barred by the double jeopardy doctrine. See
Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Ct., 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Weaselhead, 36
F. Supp. 2d 908 (D. Neb. 1997). In Enas, the Ninth Circuit held that the "Duro-fix" legislation
was a confirmation of inherent sovereignty and not a delegation of federal power, and thus,
there was no double jeopardy bar to a concurrent tribal/federal prosecution. United States v.
Enas, 204 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Enas case.
United States v. Enas, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002).
[Vol. 5:2
Jan. 2003] TRIBALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CULTURAL PLURALISM 397
V. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CHALLENGES OF
PLURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM
Indigenous peoples' claims for self-determination might suggest
an absence of identification with civil society. Although this would
almost certainly be true of groups which seek to secede from the na-
tion-state, it is not true of the vast majority of indigenous groups who
seek to remain within the nation-state with recognition of their sepa-
rate political status. In the United States, for example, Indian nations
consistently refer to the "trust relationship" that they have with the
federal government. They seek to affirm treaty promises of mutual
protection, respect, and alliance. Similarly, in Quebec, the Cree
people continue to resist Quebec's effort to secede from Canada and
incorporate them into a sovereign Quebec.' 8° Significantly, the Cree
describe themselves as a "people bound to Canada by a treaty and the
land itself," and cite the right of self-determination in favor of the
Crees' "aspirations and our rights to share equally in the develop-
ment of our country.0
81
As these statements demonstrate, many tribal members feel a dual
allegiance that coincides, in some measure, with a concept of com-
mon citizenship. In the United States, for example, many Native
people perceive themselves as members of their Indian nation and
also as "Americans. "'82 Images of this dual allegiance appear
throughout history. For example, during World War II, the Navajo
Code Talkers held strong ties to the Navajo Nation as well as to the
United States, and they believed that their participation in the War
was a matter of tribal honor as well as national honor. It may seem
ironic that less than a century before World War II, Navajos were at
war with the United States, while during World War II, Navajo men
were some of the strongest patriots of the United States. Yet that is
the legacy of the Navajo Nation's Treaty of 1868, which pledges a re-
lationship of respect, honor, and alliance between the two nations.
The notion of "treaty constitutionalism," which is illustrated by the
Cree and Navajo examples, is at the core of indigenous-European re-
lations in the United States and Canada. And although the idea of
simultaneous political communities may seem out of place with the
republican ideal of citizens coming together as a unified political
community, the American concept of "federalism" speaks to a differ-
ent reality. Under the American Constitution, the states and the fed-
180 See GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES, SOVEREIGN INJUSTICE: FORCIBLE INCLUSION OF THE
JAMES BAY CREES AND CREE TERRITORY INTO A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC (1995).
181 Id.
182 It should be acknowledged that some Native people refuse to identify themselves as
"Americans" and consider the blanket grant of United States citizenship upon American Indi-
ans in 1924 to be an illegitimate act.
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eral government operate in distinct, although overlapping, spheres of
political power. Indeed, American federalism is premised on the no-
tion of a "dual, or divided sovereignty."'' 83 "Legal sovereignty" is
vested in the agents of the central government, while "political sover-
eignty" resides with the people.i84 The often tumultuous struggles for
political power between the states and the federal government are
the result of this divided sovereignty. The separate political status of
Indian nations, which is recognized by the Constitution, is consistent
with the broader structure of American federalism.""
However, the analogy between states and tribes within the federal
system fails with respect to the structural protections for sovereignty.
State political existence has structural protection under the American
Constitution. Moreover, the states defined the terms of the compact
when they entered the Union. Thus, the regional cultural differ-
ences among non-Indian citizens have a structural framework for ad-
judication. The Indian nations, on the other hand, cling to tribalism
as the only way to preserve their separate political identity. As the
Mashpee case demonstrates, to the extent that they give up the social,
political, or cultural aspects of tribalism, Native people risk a deter-
mination of "detribalization" and concomitant loss of all special
rights.
Importantly, Indian nations represent distinct political and cul-
tural groups. If the effort of civic republicanism is to provide a uni-
form "civil culture" for all citizens, this is likely to pose an obstacle for
Native American participation in civil society. Such an effort would
invoke the assimilationist rhetoric of "detribalization" and jeopardize
the separate political status of Native peoples. In fact, the Supreme
Court has already taken a step in this direction with respect to Native
Hawaiian peoples. In its decision in Rice v. Cayetano, the Supreme
Court struck down a Native Hawaiian voting preference for trustees
in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, finding that this was an illegitimate
"racial" classification and was not a "political" classification.", In
making its decision, the Court emphasized that Native Hawaiians, like
the Asian and European immigrants to Hawaii, are now all "American
citizens" and the United States Constitution has become "the heritage
of all the citizens of Hawaii."
Can tribal cultural and political identity be reconciled within the
larger unitary construction of civil society and common citizenship?
183 WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 54.
184 Id.
185 The Commerce Clause of the American Constitution, for example, recognizes the power
of Congress to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In setting the tribes apart from both foreign
nations and the states, the Constitution recognizes the separate political status of the tribes.
1s6 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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As a starting point, I would suggest that we overcome the assumption
that our political structure is enriched and strengthened by a federa-
tion of distinct groups, 18 7 but that our civil structure will be harmed by
the presence of separate groups.' 88 Of course, many would argue that
it is precisely because of the multiplicity of groups in political life that
we must construct a common basis for citizens to engage in mutual
democratic governance. This appears to be the upshot of John
Rawls' work in Political Liberalism, for example, which advocates a po-
litical conception of liberalism that can transcend individual cultural
differences that might prove counterproductive to the enterprise of
government in pluralistic " " .
Notably, however, Rawls' construction of political liberalism in-
cludes only those groups which possess "reasonable" comprehensive
conceptions of the good."o In other words, to the extent that a
group's cultural beliefs are inconsistent with the "shared" construc-
tion of common citizenship which the other members of the society
have adopted, it will lose its place in adjudicating the respective rights
and position of each citizen within the society. This theory would
presumably rule out political participation by Native American gov-
ernments that are structured as theocracies, such as the Pueblos of
the American Southwest.
Rawls' views are compatible with those of several liberal and
communitarian theorists, who posit that we should not promote eth-
nic rights that will impede the final goal of "common citizenship."'91
To the extent that political theory subordinates certain cultural
groups to a uniform conception of citizenship which is premised, at
least in part, on the belief that certain values should be excluded
from the political process, this represents an assimilationist and pa-
ternalistic approach to pluralism that jeopardizes the claims of in-
digenous peoples. Adeno Addis rejects this paternalistic approach in
187 1 am assuming, of course, that there is some agreement on the positive influence of feder-
alism. One can, of course, point to moments in American history when the battles over federal-
ism carried devastating results for the Nation. I would assume that the American Civil War
stands as such an example. However, despite these moments, the history of federalism is re-
plete with examples of positive social policy overcoming destructive provincial self-interest-the
abolition of slavery, the desegregation movement, and even uniform environmental protection.
188 I consider this to be the upshot, for example, of the argument against "interest group lib-
eralism" advanced by Professor Ward. See Ward, supra note 48.
189 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia University Press 1993).
190 Id. at 16.
191 Michael Walzer makes this argument from a communitarian perspective in SPHERES OF
JUSTICE (Basic Books 1983). Steven Rockefeller makes a similar argument from a liberal per-
spective in asserting that "[o ] ur universal identity as human beings is our primary identity and is
more fundamental than any particular identity, whether it be a matter of citizenship, gender,
race, or ethnic origin." See CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTIcULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITON" 88 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
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favor of a robust notion of pluralism which he terms "critical plural-
ism." According to Addis, "critical pluralism is about providing the
necessary resources and institutional space for minority groups to ar-
ticulate a ositive identity while opening a dialogic process with other
groups., For native nations, the call of critical pluralism is even
more compelling, due to the historical circumstances that have struc-
tured their separate political and cultural identity.
Secondly, I think that we must be cautious about our efforts to
construct a "unitary" civil identity for groups which possess "dual
identities," because this may in fact preclude adjudication of impor-
tant claims to address injustice. As Amy Gutmann observes in the
context of African-American claims, for example, "[t]he divided
sense of identity on the part of African-Americans is not simply a con-
ventional signpost of a separate culture .... [i]t is... a warning sig-
nal of social injustice."'93 Gutmann suggests that a system of political
ethics which serves the reality of multiculturalism should be based on
"deliberative universalism," which she distinguishes from "compre-
hensive universalism." Comprehensive universalism entails defining a
set of substantive principles of justice that apply to all modern cul-
tures. 4 Rawls' endeavor seems more clearly in line with "compre-
hensive universalism," because he deliberately excludes cultural
groups which do not possess "reasonable" comprehensive concep-
tions of the good. In comparison, "deliberative universalism" relies
"partly upon a core of universal principles and partly upon publicly
accountable deliberation to address fundamental conflicts concern-
ing social justice."' 95 In this respect, Gutmann's theory is more consis-
tent with Addis' account of "critical pluralism." Gutmann asserts that
her theory can address even those cases where citizens have "funda-
mental moral disagreements," such as the controversy over abor-
tion.'9 According to Gutman, such conflicts are best addressed by
"actual deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful
of reasonable differences. -"' 97
Finally, I would argue that indigenous claims for self-
determination should be construed as providing a common basis for
19 Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 615, 621 (1992).
193 Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 P1IL. & PUB. AFF. 171,
186-87 (1993).
19 Id. at 193.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 196.
197 Id. at 197. Gutmann, of course, also qualifies her theory as one that applies to "reason-
able" disagreement. What is considered "reasonable" may differ depending upon the cultural
context, but I will assume, for the sake of argument, that different groups could construct a
universal concept that would apply in the majority of cases.
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political dialogue between indigenous peoples and national govern-
ments. Moreover, it is worth exploring whether something like Gut-
man's conception of deliberative universalism can provide a guiding
set of political ethics to govern that dialogue. The concept of human
rights, for example, which underlies indigenous claims for self-
determination has a universalist quality that appeals to nation-states
and indigenous peoples alike. Yet it also has a practical purpose in
that it offers a structure to accommodate indigenous peoples' claims
for a separate political identity.
Contemporary indigenous groups are pressing for recognition of
their separate cultural and political claims within the structure of the
nation-state. Therefore, much of the dialogue that is entailed by in-
digenous claims will occur within the domestic arena. Should we as-
sume that imposition of a universalist ideal of "citizenship" is a neces-
sary prerequisite for this dialogue? I believe it is unlikely that most
tribal members would be willing to assume a mantel of "universal citi-
zenship" that, in some context, appears contrary to their fundamental
sense of cultural identity. Nor, in good faith, can these groups be ex-
cluded from the political process by characterizing their views as "un-
reasonable." This is one objection to Rawls' theory that has been ad-
vanced by scholars such as Robert Lipkin, who argue that Rawls'
approach would impose a Western liberal conception of the good on
vastly different nations and peoples, thus engaging in a sort of cul-
tural hegemony.198
Can cultural pluralism be reconciled with the notion of common
citizenship that civic republicanism deems essential for the proper
flourishing of a civil society? Richard Dagger advocates a conception
of "republican liberalism" which he claims can support a rich notion
of cultural pluralism. 99  Dagger acknowledges that his theory re-
sponds to a conception of the good, and that, in truth, republican
liberalism could not be completely "neutral or agnostic with regard to
competing conceptions of the good life." °° However, Dagger's ver-
sion of "republican liberalism" hinges on "autonomy and solidarity-
two goods, that any defensible version of cultural pluralism or 'differ-
ence' must also endorse."201 On this theory, there is a common basis
for dialogue between members of distinctive cultural groups in a civil
society.
There is, of course, active debate as to how much "difference" can
be accommodated within liberal republicanism. Iris Marion Young
198 See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, In Defense of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness,
Public Reason, and Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1996).
199 See RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES 175 (Oxford University Press 1997).
200Id.
201 Id. at 176.
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suggests that the ideal of the "civic public.., excludes women and
other groups defined as different," and stresses the role of common
citizenship as deliberation and adjudication of the "common good"
based on free will and pure reason. Dagger argues that the "politics
of difference" likewise rests upon some conception of the "common
good," and claims that his conception of republican liberalism meets
Young's challenge.203 First, he says, "a proper regard for auton-
omy.., demands that we recognize the extent of our interdepend-
ence and our obligations to others who themselves have a right of
autonomy."' ' Secondly, Dagger claims that republican liberals will
"gladly respect difference" where this helps to "instill a sense of fair
play and cooperation in people."- 5 Dagger's emphasis on autonomy
is attractive from the perspective of indigenous peoples' claims, so
long as the group nature of these claims is perceived as consistent
with the overall endeavor of civic society.
However, the emphasis on "solidarity" may be more problematic.
Many theorists have posited that multiculturalism undermines social
solidarity, and that, without "a deep feeling of solidarity, a political
society will disintegrate into quarreling factions."2 Joseph Raz agrees
that "[c]ivic solidarity is essential to the existence of a well-ordered
political society," but he disagrees that "multiculturalism is inconsis-
tent with the existence of a common culture." 7 Raz discusses how
multiculturalism can foster the existence of a common culture
founded upon "cultivation of mutual tolerance and respect. ''
Raz's discussion, however, posits the existence of relatively equal
cultural groups that interact within the same economic and political
environment. Indian nations will to some extent maintain separate
political structures and economic systems, which will delineate them
from other cultural groups. Indeed, separatism is likely to be a per-
petual condition of indigenous peoples' existence within the larger
nation-state, and could be read as inconsistent with an ideal of "soli-
darity." If "solidarity" means establishing a common basis for partici-
patory governance by distinctive groups (e.g., in conjunction with an
ethic of "mutual tolerance and respect"), this would be consistent
with indigenous people's ideals of self-determination. However, to
the extent that "solidarity" implies a totalizing function which subor-
dinates difference to "universal" identity, this would be more prob-
lematic.
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 117 (1990).
203 See DAGGER, supra note 199, at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
2W SeeJoseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, 1994 DISSENT 67, 77.
07 Id.
2°8 Id.
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Dagger also discusses Rawls' work and finds that classical republi-
canism (which Rawls supports as consistent with political liberalism)
is bereft of the virtues necessary for responsive citizenship in the
modern era-which involves efforts to justify cultural pluralism within
the political order. For Dagger, citizenship should be based on
autonomy, solidarity, deliberation and the ability to overcome naked
self-interest and shoulder civic burdens for the common good.'°9
Citizens must be able to overcome "ties of race, blood, or religion" to
engage in that common enterprise."1 Those ties, of course, are es-
sential components of tribal existence, and are rooted deep within
the Indian nations' struggle for cultural and political survival.
If indigenous peoples are to have a place in civil society, it is nec-
essary to avoid imposing a choice between dual identities and citizen-
ships and to promote the resolution of competing claims through a
dialogical process founded upon mutual respect, trust, and recogni-
tion. The separate political and cultural status of indigenous peoples
need not be inconsistent with tribal members' role within civil soci-
ety. To the contrary, this separate status entails a sense of duties and
responsibilities within, as well as between, the different spheres of
government which could have productive effects on the broader sys-
tem of governance. Moreover, if the nation-states ultimately agree to
recognize a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples, this
may alleviate some of the fears of assimilation and loss of tribal iden-
tity which currently inspire an unsatisfactory tension between indige-
nous peoples' dual citizenship roles.2 '
CONCLUSION
The effort of Indian nations to define their political identity in the
modern era corresponds to the international debates over tribalism,
sovereignty, decolonization, and democratization. Globally, ethnic
groups are mobilizing to define their own identity, and they are chal-
lenging the structures and institutions that have become the founda-
tion of the international order. Thus, national efforts to define the
place of Indian nations within American federalism are affected by
global debates over tribalism and recognition of group identity within
pluralistic societies.
2W See DAGGER, supra note 199, at 195-96.
210 Id. at 195.
21 On a similar point, Joseph Raz claims that the insecurity of existence within a multicul-
tural society can make cultural groups "more repressive than they would be were they to exist in
relative isolation." Raz, supra note 206, at 76. Thus, strengthening the respective position of
the group within the larger society might obviate the need for overly restrictive controls on in-
dividual members.
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In 1987, Professor Wilkinson noted the "progressive" nature of the
United States' Indian policy, when held to a global comparison. In
2002, the United States has assumed a position contrary to the posi-
tion that many nations have taken recently with regard to indigenous
rights. In New Zealand, Australia and Canada, the courts have
turned to discuss the nature of aboriginal rights under the guidance
of international human rights norms. In the United States, the Court
has retreated behind the neutral language of constitutionalism to re-
new the historical attack against tribalism. Indian law jurisprudence
in the future will likely be the product of the combined forces of do-
mestic and international policy. At the domestic level, the arguments
are likely to be framed according to the tension between tribalism
and American constitutionalism. At the international level, the ar-
guments will be influenced by the global debates over tribalism, cul-
tural pluralism, and the "politics of recognition."
Relevant inquiries for the future will include whether the human
rights focus of the international indigenous rights movement will fa-
cilitate tribal sovereignty or any level of governmental autonomy that
transcends the "membership" model of "inherent tribal sovereignty"
under United States federal Indian law. Moreover, can international
human rights law provide a means to overcome the cultural racism at
the core of United States Indian policy, or is contemporary interna-
tional law also rooted in a view of the "other" as "less" than the domi-
nant nation-states?
Finally, do our notions of "separatism" in Indian law conflict with
contemporary movements for multicultural constitutionalism that
speak of multiple political groups engaged in a dialogical relationship
with one another? Are tribal efforts to retain "sovereignty" consistent
or inconsistent with this emerging international order? These are the
questions that will frame the debate over the future of Indian nations
as political entities within American constitutionalism, and they re-
quire careful thought and consideration. With an appropriate com-
mitment to pluralism, it is possible to reconcile the values underlying
tribalism and constitutionalism within civil society.
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